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In the literature on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics, not enough attention has been directed to the similarities between Bohr’s
views on quantum mechanics and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Too often,
the connection is either ignored, downplayed, or denied outright. This has,
as far as a proper understanding of Bohr’s views is concerned, been detrimen-
tal, for it has contributed to the common misconception of Bohr as either
a positivist or a pragmatist thinker.3 In recent years, however, there has
been a growing number of commentators attentive enough to note the im-
portant affinities in the views of these two thinkers (for instance, Honner
1982, MacKinnon 1982, Shimony 1983, Kaiser 1992, Chevalley 1994, Faye
2008). All of these commentators are, I believe, correct; however the picture
they present to us of the connections between Bohr and Kant is one that is
painted in broad strokes. It is open to the criticism that these affinities are
merely superficial.
The contribution that I intend to make in this essay, therefore, is to
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provide a closer, structural, analysis of both Bohr’s and Kant’s views that
makes these connections more explicit. In particular, I will demonstrate the
similarities between Bohr’s argument, on the one hand, that neither the wave
nor the particle description of atomic phenomena pick out an object in the
ordinary sense of the word, and Kant’s requirement, on the other hand, that
both ‘mathematical’ (having to do with magnitude) and ‘dynamical’ (having
to do with an object’s interaction with other objects) principles must be
applicable to appearances in order for us to determine them as objects of
experience. I will argue that Bohr’s ‘Complementarity interpretation’ of
quantum mechanics, which views atomic objects as idealizations, and which
licenses the repeal of the principle of causality for the domain of atomic
physics, is perfectly compatible with, and indeed follows naturally from a
broadly Kantian epistemological framework.
There are exegetical difficulties with respect to both Bohr and Kant.
Their writings are dense and are considered to be obscure by many. Inter-
preting Kant has become something of an industry in philosophy. As for
Bohr, J.S. Bell writes of him: “While imagining that I understand the po-
sition of Einstein ... I have very little understanding of the position of his
principal opponent, Bohr” (2004 [1981], p. 155). Abner Shimony writes: “I
must confess that after 25 years of attentive—and even reverent—reading of
Bohr, I have not found a consistent and comprehensive framework for the in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics” (1985, p. 109). I do not pretend to have
succeeded, where these and other eminent physicists and philosophers have
failed, in resolving all of the problems that go along with giving a compre-
hensive and consistent interpretation of Bohr’s philosophical position. Bohr
is known to have thought highly of the Pragmatist philosophy of William
James, and Bohr’s philosophy represents, in all likelihood, a combination of
Jamesian and Kantian strands (although even this is likely an oversimplifi-
cation). In this essay it is the Kantian aspects of Bohr’s views that I will
focus on; I do not, however, believe this is the whole story.4
Understanding the Kantian aspects of Bohr’s thought is important be-
cause, although Bohr’s and Kant’s philosophies do diverge ultimately, they
nevertheless share (as I will argue) a common epistemological framework.
Any interpretation of Bohr should, therefore, start with Kant. Further, com-
paring Kant and Bohr is also invaluable for our interpretation of Kant. By
4For more on Bohr and William James, see, e.g, Folse (1985, p. 49-51).
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asking the question ‘how can a Kantian make sense of quantum mechanics?’,
one gains valuable insight into the implications of the principles of quantum
mechanics for Kantian philosophy—in particular, what the uncertainty rela-
tions, if accepted, entail for the applicability of Kant’s principle of cause and
effect.
The essay is structured as follows. In section 1, I give a detailed exe-
gesis of the main negative theses of Complementarity, as stated by Bohr. I
focus, primarily, on two works in this section: the Como paper (1928), and
the response (1935) to the EPR paper. In the Como paper, we find Bohr’s
argument that the wave description of atomic phenomena must be denied
physical reality. In the response to the EPR paper, we find a similar argu-
ment, this time against a particle description. The aim of section 2 is to show
how Bohr’s views fit comfortably into a broadly Kantian framework. Thus
I show how the reasons Bohr gives for denying physical reality to the wave
and particle descriptions would be reasons for Kant as well. Specifically, I
show how Kant’s requirement that mathematical and dynamical principles
must be applicable to appearances rules out, as it does for Bohr, granting
physical reality to either the wave or particle descriptions of elementary phe-
nomena. I also show how Bohr’s positive theses of Complementarity—his
characterization of the positive use we can make of the concepts of causality
and of position bears a resemblance to Kant’s doctrine of the antinomies and
to Kant’s ideas on the regulative use of reason as he puts them forth in the
Critique of Judgement. The third and final section of the paper is devoted to
actual and potential objections to my interpretation of Bohr. In the process
of responding to these objections, I will show how Kantian ideas influenced
Bohr by way of his close friendship with the philosopher Harald Høffding.
1. Complementarity
Heisenberg wrote his uncertainty paper in 1927. Drawing on his famous
γ-ray microscope thought experiment, and presupposing a particle interpre-
tation of elementary objects, Heisenberg argued that it is in principle impossi-
ble to precisely determine both the position and momentum of an elementary
particle at any one time. On the one hand, the inevitable disturbance (the
Compton effect) of the electron by the high-frequency photon beam needed
to determine its position precludes a precise determination of the particle’s
momentum. On the other hand, using a low-frequency beam to determine
the particle’s momentum results in an uncertainty regarding the particle’s
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position. Heisenberg showed that as the uncertainty in the determination
of one parameter approaches 0, the uncertainty in the determination of the
other parameter approaches infinity. He also demonstrated an analogous
uncertainty relationship between energy and time.
Bohr accepted the validity of the uncertainty relations, but disagreed
with Heisenberg over their significance. For (the young) Heisenberg, the sig-
nificance of the uncertainty relations is epistemic; they express a limitation
on what we can know about elementary objects (which are presupposed to
be particles). For Bohr, the uncertainty relations signify something deeper.
They express the fact that the fundamental ‘classical concepts’ which both
the particle and wave description of elementary objects presuppose (spa-
tiotemporal concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical concepts, on the
other) are inapplicable in the atomic domain, and that therefore a defini-
tion of the object in terms of these parameters is precluded. Let us work our
way towards this conclusion. In his Como paper, Bohr writes:
... [quantum theory’s] essence may be expressed in the so-called
quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an
essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign
to the classical theories and symbolised by Planck’s quantum of
action (1928, p. 580).
Contrasted with the classical theories, here, is the irreducibly ‘discrete’
nature of atomic processes; the fact that, according to quantum theory, the
observed state of an elementary object changes discontinuously with time.
What this implies, Bohr goes on to say, is that in our observations of the
results of experiments, the interaction with the ‘agency of observation’ (i.e.,
the experimental apparatus) is an ineliminable part of our description of
phenomena (in his later writings, Bohr calls this an “essential wholeness.”
Cf. 1958b, p. 72).
That last step may seem like an inferential leap, but it is comprehensible
in light of the common classical assumption that change is continuous. This
is an assumption which we also find in Kant. For Kant, the presentations of
time and space are continuous, infinitely divisible, quantities (CPR, B211).5
5References to the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) are to the Guyer-Wood transla-
tion (1998 [1781]), while references to the Critique of Judgement (CJ) are to the Pluhar
translation (1987 [1790]). Page numbers for Kant’s works are as in the standard German
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No matter how small, every ‘piece’ of space or time always presupposes a
possible further intuition of space or time within its boundaries. Kant’s
principle of cause and effect, now, tells us that every series of perceptions
has some objective ordering according to which it progresses in time. But
since time is infinitely divisible, so is the progression of perceptions (CPR,
B255). All change associated with a possible experience is continuous, there-
fore, and this is something we must presuppose a priori, according to Kant.
Bohr’s argument tacitly makes use of this assumption. Thus, on the classical
conception of nature, change is continuous. Yet the state transitions of ele-
mentary objects are irreducibly discontinuous. It follows from this that, from
a classical point of view, something is ‘missing’ from our description. What is
‘missing’, according to Bohr, is a clean distinction between the experimental
apparatus and the object of our investigations; the ‘agency of observation’
is, in some sense, a part of what we observe.
Is it the case, then, that quantum mechanical descriptions of phenomena
are not objective? No, quantum mechanical descriptions of phenomena, like
classical descriptions, are objective. However what is different is that for the
classical (but not for the quantum) case it is always possible to determinately
describe (and correct for) the interaction between apparatus and object.
There are always three components involved in my description of an object:
first, there is the experimental apparatus which I use to investigate the object;
second, there is the object of investigation; third, there is the interaction
between the apparatus and the object. In my description of a classical object,
I am able to describe the interaction between apparatus and object and I
am able to compensate for this interaction in my description; I am able to
distinguish the object ‘as it really is’ from the object ‘as it appears’. But
this is not possible for atomic phenomena. Although we must make some
‘subject-object’ distinction—some ‘cut’ in what we observe—it is an arbitrary
cut—one in which the interaction between apparatus and object cannot be
disentangled from our description of the object.
One might object that there is some arbitrariness to the cut we make in
the classical realm as well, for one will have distinct objects of inquiry de-
pending on the context of the investigation.6 But what is different is that in
edition. In the case of the first Critique, “A” denotes the first and “B” the second edition,
as usual.
6For example, sometimes it may be useful to describe a billiard ball as a single ‘particle’
in order to describe its interactions with other billiard balls in the context of a game being
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the classical case, as we correct for the interaction with the apparatus in our
description of the object, we are constrained by the (according to Bohr) crite-
ria for its independent reality: a precise location in space-time and a precise
account of its interaction with other objects. In the quantum case, how-
ever, we cannot account for the interaction with the apparatus in a way that
leaves the object with definite position/time and momentum/energy param-
eters. Our language nevertheless requires some distinction, so we arbitrarily
impose one.
Bohr expresses all of the foregoing in the following concise paragraph:
Now the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of obser-
vation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality
in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phe-
nomena nor to the agencies of observation. After all, the concept
of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which ob-
jects are included in the system to be observed. Ultimately every
observation can of course be reduced to our sense perceptions.
The circumstance, however, that in interpreting observations use
has always to be made of theoretical notions, entails that for ev-
ery particular case it is a question of convenience at what point
the concept of observation involving the quantum postulate with
its inherent ‘irrationality’ is brought in. This situation has far-
reaching consequences. On one hand, the definition of the state
of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elim-
ination of all external disturbances. But in that case, according
to the quantum postulate, any observation will be impossible,
and above all, the concepts of space and time lose their imme-
diate sense. On the other hand, if in order to make observation
possible we permit certain interactions with suitable agencies of
measurement, not belonging to the system, an unambiguous def-
inition of the state of the system is naturally no longer possible,
... (1928, p. 580).
Bohr must still explain exactly why the classical concepts are not appli-
played. If one wanted to undertake a chemical analysis of the ball, on the other hand, it
would be more useful to describe it as a collection of molecules.
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cable to elementary objects. He writes:
The fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and
the classical concepts is immediately apparent from the simple
formulae which form the common foundation of the theory of light
quanta and of the wave theory of material particles. If Planck’s
constant be denoted by h, as is well known,
Eτ = Iλ = h, . . . (1)
where E and I are energy and momentum respectively, τ and λ
the corresponding period of vibration and wave-length. In these
formulae the two notions of light and also of matter enter in sharp
contrast. While energy and momentum are associated with the
concept of particles, and hence may be characterised according
to the classical point of view by definite space-time co-ordinates,
the period of vibration and wave-length refer to a plane harmonic
wave train of unlimited extent in space and time (1928, p. 581).
In other words, in each case (i.e., for light and matter), Planck’s constant
relates two incompatible quantities. In the first relation, E is associated with
the concept of a particle given with definite spatiotemporal coordinates, while
τ is associated with a wave-train “of unlimited extent”, not conceptualizable
with respect to definite space-time coordinates. The case is the same for I
and λ. Bohr’s point is that it does not make sense to picture an object to
ourselves that is, as the above relations express, both given at some definite
spatiotemporal location and of unlimited extent in space and time. Never-
theless, physical theory does provide us with the resources we need to get
around this difficulty, whether we assume a wave or a particle description
of the object. The problem, as we shall see, is that neither description is
determinate.
For the case of the wave description, we can do this by means of the
superposition principle. Bohr writes:
Only with the aid of the superposition principle does it become
possible to obtain a connexion with the ordinary mode of de-
scription. Indeed, a limitation of the extent of the wave-fields
in space and time can always be regarded as resulting from the
interference of a group of elementary harmonic waves (1928, p.
581).
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What Bohr is describing here is essentially Schro¨dinger’s picture of the
wave packet (i.e., a wave, manifesting particle-like properties) moving through
space and time. However, although the superposition principle enables us to
construct a description of an object in this way, it necessarily involves an
element of indeterminacy with regard to that object.
Rigorously speaking, a limited wave-field can only be obtained
by the superposition of a manifold of elementary waves corre-
sponding to all the values of ν and σx, σy, σz. But the order of
magnitude of the mean difference between these values for two
elementary waves in the group is given in the most favourable
case by the condition
∆t∆ν = ∆x∆σx = ∆y∆σy = ∆z∆σz = 1 [1a]
where ∆t,∆x,∆y,∆z denote the extension of the wave-field in
time and in the direction of space corresponding to the co-ordinate
axes (Bohr, 1928, p. 581).
Here, ν refers to the frequency, and σx, σy, σz refer to the wavenumbers
for the elementary waves in the directions of the coordinate axes. All else
equal, the broader the spread of wavenumbers/frequency in the wave group,
the more determinate the spatiotemporal extent of the resultant packet, and
vice versa. Now, according to the de Broglie relations, E = h¯ν, I = h¯σ,
where h¯ = h/2pi is the reduced Planck’s constant. If we multiply equation
(1a) by h¯, this gives us Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations:
∆t∆E = ∆x∆Ix = ∆y∆Iy = ∆z∆Iz = h¯ (2)
which give the upper bound on the accuracy of momentum/position deter-
minations with respect to the wave-field.
Thus, as the wave-field associated with the object gets smaller —as we
‘zoom in’, so to speak, on its position and time coordinates—the possibility
of precisely defining the energy and momentum associated with the object
decreases in proportion. And the opposite is also true: in order to determine
the object’s momentum (or energy), we require a larger wave-field—we need
to ‘zoom out’—but this foregoes a precise determination of the object’s posi-
tion. ‘Zooming in’ and ‘zooming out’, however, are associated with different
experimental arrangements. For the case of the γ-ray microscope, they are
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associated with the finite size of the microscope’s aperture; the uncertainty
in the position and momentum of the electron arises, not because of the in-
teraction between two determinate entities (a photon and an electron), but
rather because certain experimental arrangements, well-suited for precisely
determining momentum, preclude the definition of the object in terms of
continuously changing spatiotemporal coordinates, and vice versa.
Indeed, a discontinuous change of energy and momentum during
observation could not prevent us from ascribing accurate values to
the space-time co-ordinates, as well as to the momentum-energy
components before and after the process. The reciprocal uncer-
tainty which always affects the values of these quantities is, as will
be clear from the preceding analysis, essentially an outcome of the
limited accuracy with which changes in energy and momentum
can be defined, when the wave-fields used for the determination
of the space-time co-ordinates of the particle are sufficiently small
(Bohr, 1928, p. 583).
Thus no one experimental setup allows for an exact definition of the
object in terms of both quantities. One experiment can, at most, give us
a picture of “unsharply defined individuals within finite space-time regions”
(Bohr, 1928, p. 582).
Now let us consider a particle description of the elementary object. To
simplify somewhat the example Bohr presents in his response to the EPR
paper (1935),7 consider two variations of a one-slit experiment, where a pho-
ton is directed at a small opening in a thin diaphragm, on the other side
of which is a photographic plate. In one version of the experiment, the di-
aphragm is not rigidly attached to the experimental apparatus. When we
direct the photon at the diaphragm, it exchanges momentum with the ap-
paratus as it passes through the slit, which we measure by the amount of
recoil we observe in the diaphragm. However the recoil of the diaphragm
makes it impossible to precisely determine the position of the slit, and hence
of the particle, at the moment of impact. “... we lose, on account of the
uncontrollable displacement of the diaphragm during each collision process
7In the Como paper, Bohr simply tells us that similar remarks apply to particles, but
does not elaborate in great detail (1928, p. 582).
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with the test bodies, the knowledge of its position when the particle passed
through the slit” (Bohr, 1935, p. 698).
On the other hand, if the diaphragm is rigidly fixed to the rest of the
apparatus, then as the photon passes through the slit, whatever momentum
it exchanges with the diaphragm is completely absorbed by the apparatus
(Bohr, 1935, p. 697). Like the case for the wave picture, then, we have
on our hands two experimental arrangements, one of which is compatible
with a precise position determination; the other compatible with a precise
momentum determination; however each of these excludes a determination
of (and hence a definition of the object in terms of) the other parameter.
“Indeed we have in each experimental arrangement suited for the study of
proper quantum phenomena not merely to do with an ignorance of the value
of certain physical quantities, but with the impossibility of defining these
quantities in an unambiguous way” (Bohr, 1935, p. 699).
2. A Kantian View of Complementarity
Let us stop and reflect; consider the result of some experiment, say the
mark on a photographic plate. The mark itself is a classical object. It has
definite spatiotemporal coordinates, and it causally interacts in a definite
way with its surroundings. However, this description of the phenomenon—of
the mark as a mark on a photographic plate and nothing more—includes
the photographic plate. To go further and describe the mark as a mark
that has been left by some independently existing object that has interacted
with the plate is what we desire to do, for this allows us to unify the marks
resulting from different experiments as being different manifestations of the
same independently existing object. Our goal is to ‘get at’ reality—the thing
behind the phenomena—as it exists independently of the conditions of our
experiments. We do this by eliminating the interaction between apparatus
and object from our description of the latter.
From a Kantian perspective, in order to describe the object behind the
phenomena as some independently existing8 object that we can possibly ex-
perience we must determine it according to bothmathematical and dynamical
8That is, in the sense of its being the same object in different experimental contexts.
We can never abstract, on Kant’s view, completely from the subjective conditions of ob-
servation (space and time), of course.
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principles (CPR, B198-B294).9 The former say that in order for anything
to appear to us, it must be apprehended as having, determinately, both an
extensive (length, breadth, etc.) and an intensive magnitude (i.e., a degree).
But that something appears to us is, by itself, not enough to determine this
something as a physically real object. To do this, we must apply the dynam-
ical principles. The dynamical principles are regulative for appearances,10
i.e., they are principles, not for the apprehension, but for the connection of
appearances in time; they presuppose that an appearance has already been
apprehended in accordance with the mathematical principles. These dynam-
ical principles state, first, that all change presupposes something permanent;
second, that all change must occur according to the law of cause and effect;
third, that all substances that are perceived as simultaneous are in mutual
interaction.11
To determine an appearance as an object of a possible experience, there-
fore, we require that at a determinate instant in time, it has a determinate
extent (constrained by the mathematical principles) and hence a determinate
position in space, and that there is a law (subject to the dynamical princi-
ples) by which it dynamically interacts with its surroundings in and through
time. This means that any description of elementary objects that purports
to pick out an object of possible experience must ascribe to the object both
a determinate position and a determinate momentum parameter.
Now to visualise the object, we make use, say, of the superposition prin-
ciple. But by this means it is impossible to obtain both an exact position
and an exact momentum determination (likewise for energy and time). It is
possible to obtain an exact position determination, but in that case we com-
pletely forego a determination of the object’s momentum, and vice versa. We
can, however, get something like a ‘complete’ object (i.e., one in which both
causal and spatiotemporal parameters are present in some sense) by making
9The mathematical principles are the Axioms of Intuition and Anticipations of Per-
ception; the dynamical principles are the Analogies of experience and the Postulates of
empirical thought as such.
10This sense of regulative should not be confused with the sense that Kant uses with
respect to the ‘ideas of reason’. There the distinction is between that which is constitutive
or regulative with respect to experience as a whole. Here, he uses regulative not in the
context of experience in general, but in the context of particular objects of experience.
11Here, I only consider the Analogies, as the Postulates are not directly relevant for our
discussion.
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our position and momentum determinations inexact—“unsharply defined”.
But in that case, although our description is objective, it is no longer the
description of an object of possible experience (i.e., something physically real
that we could possibly experience), for Kant—for in order for it to be phys-
ically real, we must assign determinate values to both parameters. Instead,
the object is what Kant calls a noumenon, or abstract object.
To clarify: according to Kant, a concept of the understanding must be
understood both in terms of its form and in terms of the content to which
it can be applied. We can think of the form of a concept as analogous to
a mathematical function, e.g., f(x) = 2x + 4. Now a determinate result
can be obtained for this function only if something is filled in for x. By
itself, the function only represents a form for the determination of a variable.
Likewise for a concept: without determinate content, a concept gives us no
determinate cognition. “Without [an object] it has no sense, and is entirely
empty of content, even though it may still contain the logical function for
making a concept out of whatever sort of data there are.” (CPR, B298).
The concept of a noumenon is the concept of something indeterminate—analogous
to x in the mathematical equation. The function above cannot be applied to
x itself, but only to a value that has been filled in for x. Similarly for con-
cepts: cognition of an object of possible experience requires that a concept
be applied to a determinate, not indeterminate, intuition. A concept of some
causal mechanism corresponds to a rule for the progression of perceptions
in time, and the concepts of the understanding, in general, correspond to
rules that must be applied to our sensible forms of intuition, space and time,
which are always given determinately.
But now consider an elementary particle. According to the uncertainty
relations, it is impossible in principle to describe the particle’s momentum
with any degree of precision without a corresponding loss of precision with re-
gards to its spatiotemporal coordinates. It follows that in order to describe it
using both position/time (spatiotemporal) and momentum/energy (dynam-
ical) parameters, the spatiotemporal parameters associated with it must be
made indeterminate. In fact, both the spatiotemporal and dynamical pa-
rameters must be made indeterminate, but it is the fact that the spatiotem-
poral parameters must be made indeterminate that is the key, for now, on
a Kantian picture, the dynamical principles (whether or not we ascribe de-
terminate dynamical parameters) are strictly speaking no longer applicable,
for the dynamical principles always presuppose a determinate appearance in
space and time apprehended in accordance with the mathematical principles.
12
The upshot of all of this is that since there is no determinate spatiotempo-
ral magnitude to apply the dynamical principles to, we cannot complete our
description of the object according to the Kantian criteria for objects of pos-
sible experience. Therefore the ‘object’ corresponding to our description, on
Kant’s view, is not physically real.
Bohr reaches the same conclusion regarding the physical reality of our
descriptions of elementary objects:
... a sentence like “we cannot know both the momentum and the
position of an atomic object” raises at once questions as to the
physical reality of two such attributes of the object, which can be
answered only by referring to the conditions for the unambigu-
ous use of space-time concepts, on the one hand, and dynamical
conservation laws, on the other hand. (1949, p. 211).
The issue is not the existence of atomic objects as such (it is undeni-
able that something gives rise to the phenomena we observe), but whether
our fundamental spatiotemporal and dynamical concepts are literally appli-
cable to them. Evidently, according to both Bohr and Kant, they are not.
And yet these ‘ordinary’ concepts, for Bohr, are also necessary concepts.
The experimental apparatus (a voltmeter, say) is always a piece of classical
equipment which communicates classical information about what we assume
to be (using classical criteria) an independently existing object. The concept
of observation itself, therefore, presupposes the classical concepts.
Here, it must above all be recognized that, however far quan-
tum effects transcend the scope of classical physical analysis, the
account of the experimental arrangement and the record of the
observations must always be expressed in common language sup-
plemented with the terminology of classical physics. (Bohr, 1948,
p. 313).
The main point here is the distinction between the objects under
investigation and the measuring instruments which serve to de-
fine, in classical terms, the conditions under which the phenomena
appear. (Bohr, 1949, pp. 221-222).
We require the classical concepts, not only to observe, but also to com-
municate experimental results:
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... the requirement of communicability of the circumstances and
results of experiments implies that we can speak of well defined
experiences only within the framework of ordinary concepts (Bohr,
1937, p. 293).
The situation seems hopeless. We require the classical criteria in order
to observe a physical object and to communicate the experience; yet, the
classical criteria cannot fulfil their intended function in the atomic domain,
for they mutually exclude each other. Ironically, it is the uncertainty re-
lations that save us. They guarantee that we can nevertheless achieve a
unified description by ‘patching together’ the mutually exclusive dynamical
and spatiotemporal descriptions of the object under different experimental
conditions. “The apparently incompatible sorts of information about the
behaviour of the object under examination which we get by different ex-
perimental arrangements can clearly not be brought into connection with
each other in the usual way, but may, as equally essential for an exhaustive
account of all experience, be regarded as “complementary” to each other”
(Bohr, 1937, p. 291). The uncertainty relations guarantee that a causal
description can never contradict a spatiotemporal description—that the two
can be used in a complementary way—for any experiment intended to deter-
minately establish the object’s spatiotemporal coordinates can tell us nothing
about its dynamical parameters, and vice versa.
the proper roˆle of the indeterminacy relations consists in assuring
quantitatively the logical compatibility of apparently contradic-
tory laws which appear when we use two different experimental
arrangements, of which only one permits an unambiguous use of
the concept of position, while only the other permits the applica-
tion of the concept of momentum ... (Bohr, 1937, p. 293).
We are not licensed, however, to take the next step and ascribe physical
reality to this ‘patched together’ object of our descriptions, for the object is
not real but abstract, and its classical attributes are idealizations.
From the above considerations it should be clear that the whole
situation in atomic physics deprives of all meaning such inherent
attributes as the idealizations of classical physics would ascribe
to the object (Bohr, 1937, p. 293).
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It is not too difficult to make sense of this from a Kantian point of view.
Again, the concept of a noumenon is the key—this time in its positive signi-
fication. When we speak of noumena in the negative sense, as we did above,
we say that they are not objects of sensible intuition, and hence not phys-
ically real in the sense that a noumenon cannot be an object of a possible
experience for us. Even in this merely negative signification, however, they
still have a use; and it is this negative signification of noumena which Kant
emphasises in the Critique of Pure Reason.
I call a concept problematic that contains no contradictions but
that is also, as a boundary for given concepts, connected with
other cognitions, the objective reality of which can in no way be
cognized. The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is
not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a
thing in itself (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all
contradictory; for one cannot assert of sensibility that it is the
only possible kind of intuition. Further, this concept is necessary
in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in themselves,
and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition ...
(CPR, B310-311).
Kant’s negative sense of noumena is well-known. Less well-known outside
the circle of Kant scholarship is that noumena also have a positive signifi-
cation, as objects of nonsensible intuition (CPR, B308-309); i.e., as objects
of an intuition which is intellectual. In this sense, we call them ideas or
‘concepts of reason’. Kant writes: “Concepts of reason serve for compre-
hension, just as concepts of the understanding serve for understanding
(of perceptions)” (CPR, A311/B367). Concepts of the understanding corre-
spond to rules for synthesizing the manifold of intuition. Thus ‘chessboard’,
for example, corresponds to a rule according to which this particular bit of
white, that particular bit of black, etc. can be associated in one representa-
tion. Concepts of reason, on the other hand, do not correspond to rules for
associating sensible intuitions; rather, they correspond to rules for associating
concepts of the understanding (CPR, B377). They are regulative concepts in
the sense that we use them to connect the understanding’s concepts (which
in our case would be the various descriptions of phenomena, i.e., the ‘marks’,
observed in the context of individual experiments) together in a coherent
way in the context of our overall experience. Kant’s main discussion of the
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regulative use of the ideas of reason is not in the Critique of Pure Reason
but in the Critique of Judgement.
All other pure concepts the critique relegates to the ideas, which
are transcendent for our theoretical cognitive power, though that
certainly does not make them useless or dispensable, since they
serve as regulative principles: they serve, in part, to restrain
the understanding’s arrogant claims, namely, that (since it can
state a priori the conditions for the possibility of all things it
can cognize) it has thereby circumscribed the area within which
all things in general are possible; in part, they serve to guide
the understanding, in its contemplation of nature, by a principle
of completeness—though the understanding cannot attain this
completeness—and so further the final aim of all cognition. (CJ,
5:167-168).
Thus, these regulative ideas guide our research. They prompt us to search
for relations between our concepts—species-genus relations, relations of part
to whole, etc.—and they (indirectly) serve to expand the realm of our cogni-
tion. At certain times these regulative ideals may conflict, as in the case of
the conflict between the mechanistic and teleological conceptions of nature.
The key to resolving these conflicts lies in the fact that even in their positive
signification, regulative ideas do not yield cognition. All cognition must refer
to the conditions for a possible experience. Ideas of reason are
referred to a concept, according to an objective principle, but
these ideas still can never yield cognition of the object ... Ra-
tional ideas are transcendent concepts; they differ from concepts
of the understanding, which are called immanent because they
can always be supplied with an experience that adequately cor-
responds to them. (CJ, 5:342).
And since we cannot cognize anything by them, then so long as these
ideas are used merely as methodological principles they are compatible with
each other.
Now the classical spatiotemporal and dynamical concepts, when they
transcend possible experience, become ideas—they become the classical dy-
namical and spatiotemporal idealizations at the heart of the mechanistic
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conception of nature (Cf. CJ, §§69-78).12,13 In the realm of atomic physics,
however, these dynamical and spatiotemporal idealizations are incompatible
in the sense that we cannot use them to describe a classical object. The
uncertainty relations tell us that a precise determination of one type of pa-
rameter entirely excludes any determination whatsoever of the other type;
therefore, they cannot be used to determine an object of possible experience,
which requires a determination of both. But precisely because they say noth-
ing about the objects of possible experience in this sense, they are compatible
with the objects of possible experience—the results of our experiments—just
so long as we understand that when we use these ideas in our description of
nature it is only a manner of speaking; we may only speak ‘as if’ these ideas
apply to our observations.
We must be clear that, when it comes to atoms, language can be
used only as poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned
with describing facts as with creating images and establishing
mental connections (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 41, recollecting a con-
versation with Bohr from years before).
Those familiar with Kant should immediately recognize the strategy be-
ing employed here. When confronted with other areas (biology and ethics, for
instance) of human inquiry where the mechanistic conception (on his view) is
either inadequate or inappropriate, Kant appeals to his doctrine of the anti-
nomies to show that competing conceptions (e.g., freedom and determinism,
mechanism and teleology) are merely ideas, and that they are compatible
with each other if treated as such (Cf. CPR, B566-567, B586, CJ, §§69-78).
12Among Kant scholars, there is debate over whether Kant’s discussion of the principle
of causality is consistent between the first and third critiques, for in the first Critique the
principle of causality is considered as being constitutive for any possible experience, while
in the third it is considered as regulative for experience as a whole. On one side, there are
commentators, such as John Zammito (1992, pp. 222-224), who believe that the status of
the principle of causality actually changes between the first and third critiques. On the
other, there are commentators, such as Henry Allison (1991), who view the change to be
merely with regard to a point of view; i.e., causality is considered in the ‘narrow’ sense in
the first critique (in which it is constitutive), and in the ‘wide’ sense (as having universal
applicability) in the third (in which it is determined to be merely regulative).
13See, also, Pringe (2009) who argues that these are intended, by Bohr, to be ‘symbolic
analogies’ with classical concepts.
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3. Concerns and Objections
One might object that a Kantian should not feel herself committed to
anything like Complementarity, for one may opt to view the uncertainty re-
lations as an expression of the temporary state of our ignorance with regard
to elementary particles, and not as a final word. This is correct. A Kan-
tian need not follow Bohr. However, if, as a Kantian, one does accept the
uncertainty relations, then something like Complementarity must be the re-
sult—this is what it was my intention to show in this paper. Indeed, as I
have shown, it is because one starts from within the Kantian framework that
the motivation for Complementarity arises. It is unclear what Kant himself
would have thought, but the following discussion of the mechanistic versus
the teleological conceptions of nature may give us a clue.
... I ought always to reflect on these events and forms in terms of
the principle of the mere mechanism of nature, and hence ought
to investigate this principle as far as I can, because unless we
presuppose it in our investigation [of nature] we can have no cog-
nition of nature at all in the proper sense of the term. But none of
this goes against the second maxim—that on certain occasions, in
dealing with certain natural forms (and, on their prompting, even
with all of nature), we should probe these and reflect on them in
terms of a principle that differs entirely from an explanation in
terms of the mechanism of nature ... (CJ, 5:387-388).
Although both the mechanistic and the teleological conceptions are thought
of as ‘complementary’ ideas which guide our investigation of nature, priority
is clearly given, nevertheless, to the mechanistic conception. The use of the
teleological conception is reserved only for ‘certain occasions’ in which the
mechanistic conception is either inapplicable (perhaps only temporarily) or
inappropriate. It is likely that Kant would have been more conservative than
Bohr, i.e., that he would not have accepted the uncertainty relations as final.
In that case, one way to interpret Bohr’s Complementarity doctrine is as
an attempted refutation of what he took to be Kantian philosophy, with its
overemphasis on the mechanistic conception of nature. Indeed, this is one
way to reconcile Bohr’s oft-cited criticisms of ‘a priorism’ (Cf. Folse 1985,
pp. 217-221) with his insistence on the bedrock-like status of the classical
concepts.
18
Potentially problematic for my reading, however, are statements like the
following: “... no experience is definable without a logical frame and ... any
apparent disharmony can be removed only by an appropriate widening of the
conceptual framework” (Bohr, 1958b, p. 82), which lead Kaiser to write, of
Bohr’s view:
... there is also a very un-Kantian sentiment expressed in the end
of Bohr’s quotation: our formal frame might need to be altered.
... Kant viewed this formal frame, which includes the forms of
intuition and the categories, as a priori and unalterable. Bohr
followed a two-faculty format but he rejected a priorism. (Kaiser,
1992, pp. 222-223)
Yet Kaiser’s interpretation is misleading, at best, for it seems to conflate
Bohr’s view with (the later) Heisenberg’s. Heisenberg maintained that the
gradual evolution of scientific concepts (or even the human species) would
allow us to transcend our limitation to the classical concepts (Cf. Heisenberg
1959, p. 83, Heisenberg 1971, p. 124). This was not Bohr’s view: “... it
would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory
may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by
new conceptual forms” (1934, p. 16). And again:
We must, in fact, realise that the unambiguous interpretation
of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of the
classical physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the
language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of
physicists for all time (1931, p. 692).
What Bohr means by ‘widening’, then, is not a fundamental alteration of
our basic conceptual framework, but an imaginative use of our framework’s
own resources in order to extend its reach. “Indeed, the development of
atomic physics has taught us how, without leaving common language, it is
possible to create a framework sufficiently wide for an exhaustive description
of new experience” (1958a, p. 88, emphasis mine).
Specifically related to Kant, Folse objects that Kant was a ‘subjectivist’
philosopher, while Bohr’s intention was to provide an objective description
of experience. Folse writes:
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These facts have given rise to the view held by some of the most
perceptive of Bohr’s interpreters that his position contains Kan-
tian elements supporting a subjectivistic reading of complemen-
tarity. Since Bohr specifically stated complementarity provides
an objective description of experience, it would seem that virtu-
ally any such reading would be contrary to his intent ... (Folse,
1985, p. 217).
But this misinterprets Kant. Kant’s theoretical philosophy revolves around
the question of how to give an objective description of experience; thus in
the second analogy, for instance, he takes great pains to show how our appli-
cation of the principle of cause and effect to appearances must be such as to
distinguish the objective succession of appearances from the subjective one
(CPR, B232-257). If not subscribing to na¨ıve realism amounts to being a
subjectivist then Kant is guilty on all counts; however I do not think this is
the type of subjectivism that Folse is referring to, for Bohr would be guilty
of this charge as well. For Kant, possible experience is constrained by the
forms of our intuition, space and time, and by the concepts by which we are
able to combine these intuitions into one representation of an object. But
this is no different from Bohr’s insistence that we require classical concepts
for the unambiguous description of experience.
Bohr was known to have admired the work of the American pragmatist
William James, and this has been taken by Folse (1985, pp. 49-51, 217-
221) to tell against a Kantian influence on Bohr, for James was sharply
critical of Kant. As Kaiser points out, however, James’ criticisms of Kant
are all directed at Kant’s a priorism and not at the other aspects of his
philosophy. This is perfectly compatible with a picture of Bohr as accepting
certain aspects of Kant’s philosophy while rejecting others. It is certainly not
without precedent for one philosopher to be influenced by two rivals: Kant
himself was strongly influenced by both Newton and Leibniz; their rivalry
did not stop him from incorporating aspects of both of their views into his
own.
Indeed, many philosophers have borrowed from Kant without making
themselves into carbon copies. The Neo-Kantian philosopher, Ernst Cas-
sirer, for instance, rejects the a priori status of Kant’s classical concepts
(1956 [1936], pp. 194-195) while still maintaining a broadly Kantian epis-
temology; the intuitionist mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer was strongly in-
fluenced by Kant—Brouwer, like Kant, founds arithmetic on the pure in-
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tuition of time—yet Brouwer rejects the pure intuition of space in light of
the development of non-Euclidean geometry. Both Reichenbach and Carnap
began their careers as Neo-Kantians before turning towards logical empiri-
cism in light of the developments in geometry and logic (Friedman, 2000;
Glymour and Eberhardt, 2008). Frege, throughout his career, though criti-
cal of Kant’s views on arithmetic, nevertheless believed Kant to be correct
for the case of geometry, even in the wake of the modern developments.14
After mercilessly skewering most of his own contemporaries and predeces-
sors, Frege writes, of Kant: “I have no wish to incur the reproach of picking
petty quarrels with a genius to whom we must all look up with grateful awe;
I feel bound, therefore, to call attention also to the extent of my agreement
with him, which far exceeds any disagreement” (Frege, 1980, §89). Brouwer’s
arch-rival, Hilbert, was also influenced by Kant. Hilbert, in the epigraph to
his Foundations of Geometry, quotes Kant: “All human knowledge begins
with intuitions, thence passes to concepts and ends with ideas” (Hilbert,
1902). All of these thinkers incorporated parts of Kantian philosophy into
their own. Bohr was a contemporary of all of these men; further, he had ac-
cess to Kantian ideas through his lifelong friend and mentor, the philosopher
Harald Høffding, who himself was substantively influenced by Kant. Con-
sider Høffding’s analysis of Kantian philosophy, in light of our discussion of
Complementarity:
Experience not only implies that we conceive something in space
and time, but likewise that we are able to combine what is given
in space and time in a definite way, i.e. as indicated in the
concepts of magnitude and causality. This is the only means
of distinguishing between experience and mere representation or
imagination. All extensive and intensive changes must proceed
continuously, i.e. through every possible degree of extension and
intensity, otherwise we could never be certain of having any real
experience. Gaps and breaks must be impossible (non datur hia-
tus non datur saltus). The origin of each particular phenomenon
moreover must be conditioned by certain other phenomena, ...
Wherever there appear to be gaps in the series of perceptions
we assume that further investigation will discover the intervening
members. This demonstration of the validity of the categories of
14Cf. Merrick (2006) for more on the relation between Kant and Frege.
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magnitude and causality likewise involves a limitation: The va-
lidity of the categories can only be affirmed within the range of
possible experience; they cannot be applied to things which from
their very nature cannot become objects of experience (Høffding,
1922, 147-148).
Høffding, who was almost exclusively responsible for Bohr’s philosophical
education, was a close friend and colleague of Niels Bohr’s father, Christian
Bohr. The two of them, along with their colleagues Christian Christiansen
and Vilhelm Thomsen, would often meet at each others’ houses after sessions
of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters to discuss the scien-
tific and philosophical issues that were brought up at those meetings. The
gatherings continued in the Bohr home from the time Niels was 8 or 9 years
old up until his father’s death in 1911 (Faye, 1991, pp. 13-14), and Niels was
likely given the opportunity to listen to their discussions. While in university,
Bohr took the required introductory-level philosophy course with Høffding.
Shortly after, Niels, his brother Harald, and a small group of other students
from Høffding’s classes began to meet to discuss philosophical issues. The
“Ekliptica group,” as it was called, attended Høffding’s more advanced sem-
inars and public lectures on philosophy and met regularly from around 1905
until at least 1909. Niels and Harald were both active participants at these
meetings (Faye, 1991, p. 20). Høffding remained a close friend of Niels, and
the two of them regularly corresponded and discussed philosophical questions
up until Høffding’s death in 1931 (Faye, 1991, ch. 3).
Høffding’s own views were, as Faye relates, “... somewhere between Kant’s
notion of a priori categories and the theories of knowledge characteristic of
pragmatism as they were developed by his contemporaries Charles S. Peirce
and William James as well as Ernst Mach and James Clerk Maxwell.” (1991,
p. 12). Høffding held, like Kant, that causality is the criterion for reality.
Høffding distinguished, however, between the concept and the principle of
causality (Faye, 1991, pp. 81-82) (for Kant, these correspond to the consti-
tutive principle of causality of the first critique, and the regulative principle
of causality, or ‘idea of mechanism’, of the third). According to Høffding,
cognition is only possible if we subsume particulars under the concept of
causality, and thus bring them them into a stable continuous connection
with the rest of our cognition (Faye, 1991, pp. 82-83). But since, consid-
ered as a principle, one cannot demonstrate the universal applicability of
causality, it follows that not everything in our experience can be turned into
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cognition. There always remains an ‘irrational’ element, therefore, which we
cannot comprehend into the totality of our experience (Faye, 1991, p. 85).
As we have seen, these views are echoed by Bohr and find their source in
Kant’s epistemological framework.
A last objection that I will address, before concluding, is with regards
to the common misconception of Bohr as a positivist. This conception of
Bohr has been popularised by, among others, Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.
I will not spend much time answering it here. In addition to directing the
interested reader to Don Howard’s illuminating article (2004) on the sub-
ject, I will simply point out that this is a view that Bohr (as recollected by
Heisenberg) explicitly denied: “Positivist insistence on conceptual clarity is,
of course, something I fully endorse, but their prohibition of any discussion
of the wider issues, simply because we lack clear-cut enough concepts in this
realm, does not seem very useful to me—this same ban would prevent our
understanding of quantum theory” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 208, recollecting an
old conversation with Bohr).
One may, of course, ignore Bohr here and presume to understand him
better than he understood himself. If one were to make such a claim, it
would not be objectionable as such; however, given the current, and widely
acknowledged, dearth of understanding with respect to Bohr’s views on quan-
tum mechanics, such a presumption should be regarded as highly dubious.
In this paper I have highlighted the parallels between Bohr’s doctrine
of Complementarity and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. We have seen how
Bohr’s principle of complementarity and Kant’s theoretical philosophy are
common in their approach: that both approaches are centred around what
each thinker took to be the limits of objective experience. We have seen
how, in order to transcend these limits, Bohr appealed to what a Kantian
would call noumena in the positive sense, or ideas of reason. We have seen
how a Kantian (who does not deny the validity of the uncertainty relations),
starting from the principles of Kantian philosophy, would be led to many of
the same conclusions as Bohr. Finally, we have seen how the objections to
the link between the two thinkers rest on either a misinterpretation of Kant,
or on a misrepresentation of Bohr, or both.
Complementarity is the natural outcome of a broadly Kantian episte-
mological framework and a Kantian approach to natural science, conjoined
with Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations. There is a very strong similarity in
spirit, if not in technical detail, between Bohr’s and Kant’s approaches to
natural science, and I hope to have inspired the conviction that the further
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examination of these similarities (and differences) will lead us to a better
understanding of both of these men.
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